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THE LEGAL PROFESSION ON TRIAL:
GROUP LEGAL SERVICES
by George Moscone* and
James S. Reed**
I.
As our society becomes more congested and complex, more pros-
perous and mobile, its members, both individual and institutional, tend
to come into conflict more often. Since resort to the legal apparatus
is the established means of regulating relationships and resolving con-
flicts, there is a naturally resulting increase in the need for legal serv-
ices.
Moreover, the developing awareness generated by sophisticated
means of communication and nearly universal education has resulted
in an increasing and sometimes violent focus on the rights of the in-
dividual. As the individual's demands for equal rights become more
intense, the legal profession is increasingly pressured to respond-to
make available proper, practicable, and' economically feasible means
for ensuring the enforcement of such rights. If the profession fails to
respond to those demands from within, it will surely open itself to
restructuring from without, by court decree,1 by legislative action,-
* Senator Moscone is a member of the California State Senate. He serves on the
Senate Committees on Judiciary, Revenue and Taxation, Education, Elections and Reap-
portionment, and is Democratic Floor Leader. A.B., University of Pacific, 1953; J.D.,
Hastings College of Law, 1956; member of the California Bar.
** James Reed is consultant to the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, Cali-
fornia Legislature. A.B., San Diego State College, 1961; J.D., Hastings College of
Law, 1965; member of the California Bar.
I The right to counsel in criminal cases has been established by court decree. The
key case was Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which overruled Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and established in state courts the right to trial counsel in
non-capital cases. A truly enlightened legal profession would have made this right a
reality many years earlier; it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court was forced to make
the decision and thereby appear ahead of the times. Progressive reforms brought about
by the profession itself would do much to alleviate criticism of the courts. See also
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
2 A bill [Cal. A.B. 1692, Reg. Sess. (1968) (McMillan)] was introduced in the
California Legislature in 1968 which would have authorized law students to make court
appearances under supervision on behalf of a district attorney, public defender, or
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by a general acceptance of legal services performed by laymen or lay
organizations. More importantly, if society itself, acting through the
legal profession, fails to respond to the reasonable demands of its mem-
bers for legal equality, such failure, apart from constituting a moral
injustice, will inevitably be a significant factor in increased civil tur-
moil and incipient revolt.
It is therefore abundantly clear that the single most important func-
tion of the legal profession today is that of providing proper and ade-
quate legal services to all the people. To the extent that needed legal
services are not readily and reasonably available, that function is not
being properly performed and the dangers mentioned above become
more vivid. To be sure, the government, the courts, and the legal
profession have long recognized the importance of having trained
counsel available if the ideal of equality before the law is to be at-
tained.4 But past and present efforts, no matter how successful, do
not justify complacency if that ideal has not been fully realized. Cer-
county counsel; there were many requests for amendments to the measure to also allow
students to assist legal aid clinics and similar agencies. Although the legislation did not
pass, it will certainly be introduced again in more sophisticated form and with better
organized support. The State Bar is studying the matter and will submit proposals to
the Legislature. A convincing argument can be made that such a measure would result
in savings to the taxpayer, since it would reduce the constant pressure for increased
staff in the public agencies benefited.
3 In 1958 the President of the State Bar of California appointed a Committee on
Group Legal Services to study the problems presented by group service arrangements.
Heafey, Message of the President, 33 CAL. S.B.J. 213 (1958). The Committee made
note of the widespread operation of group, legal services in California, including the
following:
1. The California Teachers Association retains counsel to render a variety of legal
services to the Association and to particular members on matters related to their
profession. Standing Comm. on Group Legal Services, Report, 34 CAL. S.B.J. 318
(1959).
2. Counsel retained by corporations commonly perform legal services for officers
and employees. Id.
3. Trade unions and their attorneys establish varied types of group services. The
Committee made specific note of the plan established by the Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen, which was disapproved in Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504,
225 P.2d 508 (1950). Id.
Regarding the practice of non-lawyers before administrative agencies see vom Baur,
The Practice of Nonlawyers Before Administrative Agencies, 15 FED. B.J. 103 (1955).
California's small claims court procedure is specifically structured to omit attorneys.
CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. § 117g (West Supp. 1969).'
4 The widespread growth and acceptance of legal aid clinics, lawyer reference serv-
ices, and public defenders are an indication of concern within government and the
profession. The decisions regarding the right to counsel in criminal cases, such as
Gideon, Miranda, Escobedo, Massiah, and Johnson, emphasize the vital importance most
courts attach to the right to and availability of competent counsel.
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tainly, few will argue that it has.
There appear to be several reasons why the gap between the need
and the response has not been bridged. The potential litigant may
simply fear lawyers and courts and therefore be unwilling to take ac-
tion, or he may not recognize that he has a problem subject to resolu-
tion by resort to legal counsel and the courts.' This fear can be par-
tially alleviated by use of normal educational channels.0 Another
reason for the continued existence of the gap is that many persons do
not know how to find a competent attorney in whom they can place
their trust.7  This motivated the organized bar to implement the law-
yer reference service program, which has been partially successful but
certainly inadequate to solve the entire problem." Finally, there is the
economic factor. Persons who cannot pay, or who cannot pay enough,
will obviously not be accepted as clients by an attorney who must rely
on fees for his income. It may be observed in this context that the
person who cannot pay at all-the true indigent-will probably qualify
for legal aid or the like, but one who cannot qualify as an indigent
and yet is still unable to afford normal attorney fees is likely to re-
main without representation.
It is not our present purpose to demonstrate that there is in fact an
unfilled need for more legal services. That has been amply demon-
5 See, e.g., LAWYERS PRACTICE MANVAL 3-53 (Prentice-Hall ed. 1964); Carlin & How-
ard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381 (1965).
The Assembly Judicary Committee of the California Legislature receives many letters
each month from lay members of the public, which demonstrate the public's fear or igno-
rance. Most involve domestic, welfare, or wage garnishment problems. For example,
a typical complaint might be from a wife whose husband is supporting children and a
wife from a prior marriage. The former wife is now working at a job which pays well,
and the dual obligation of the husband is making life unbearable in the second marriage.
Usually the complaining wife castigates the court for "ruining" her husband in the di-
vorce action and appeals to the addressee for relief. She is usually satisfied, however,
by a simple reply explaining that the court will probably modify the support order in
such circumstances and that legal aid services are available, if needed, for assistance in
commencing the proper action.
6 Those providing legal services for the poor recognize more and more that offices
must be established in the less affluent neighborhoods if such programs are to operate
most efficiently. The San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, which
has offices in five core areas within the city, operates on this principle.
7 See, e.g., Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle
Classes, 63 CoLtm. L. REv. 973 (1963); Carlin & Howard, supra note 5; Standing
Comm. on Group Legal Services, Report, 39 CAL. S.B.J. 639 (1964).
8 See Special Comm. on Legal Service Bureaus, Report, 65 A.B.A. REP. 255 (1940);
Special Comm. on Legal Service Bureaus, Report, 66 A.B.A. REP. 321 (1941); House
of Delegates, Proceedings, 71 A.B.A. REP. 108 (1946); Special Comm. on Legal Serv-
ice Policies, Report, 71 A.B.A. REP. 240 (1946).
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strated by studies beginning in the 1930's9 and by persuasive argu-
ment.'" It can be further demonstrated by mere observation.' Suf-
fice it to say that no one fails to recognize the need. The only dif-
ferences are over the proper means of satisfying it.
II
The gap between the need and the response can be effectively
bridged by implementation of a practicable, properly regulated system
of group legal services. These services have been defined as:
Legal services performed by an attorney for a group of individuals
who have a common problem or problems, or who have joined together
as a means of best bargaining for a predetermined position, or who
have voluntarily formed, or become members of an association with
the aim that such association shall perform a service to its members in
a particular field or activity, or through common interests it appears
that the organization can gain a benefit to the members as a whole.
Examples of such organizations are labor unions, employer organiza-
tions, trade associations, teachers' groups, civil service employees or
any body politic, members of a social club or of an automobile club,
fraternal organizations, and numerous other such associations. In-
cluded also may be groups who associate themselves for the purpose
of establishing a plan of prepaid legal services to be rendered to in-
dividual members thereof, whether or not the members have a common
interest in a certain field of activity.
12
It is helpful to understand that the "group?' in question is the associa-
tion of persons seeking legal services, not the attorneys who provide
those services, and the beneficiary of the services is ordinarily the
individual within the group and not the group itself.
The principal advantage of group legal services to the individual
receiving them would be economic. The attorney selected by the
group to represent its members in certain types of cases would be as-
9 See, e.g., E. Koos, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW (1949); LAWYER'S PRACTCE MANuAL,
supra note 5; Clark & Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An A.A.L.S. Survey, 47
YALE L.J. 1272 (1938); S.B.J., supra note 7.
10 Professor Karl Llewellyn of the Columbia University School of Law, in one of
the earliest and best articles on the subject, argued that the widespread unauthorized
practice of law is a symptom of the legal profession's failure to make its services avail-
able in critical areas. He urged "group action" to get the business done "in keeping
with the age." Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures? 5 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 104, 134 (1938).
11 Again, anyone familiar with the profession is aware of the growth of legal aid
clinics, reference services, and public defender offices.
12 S.B.J., supra note 7, at 661.
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sured of a continuing volume of business and would be able, in nor-
mal circumstances, to increase his efficiency and thereby reduce the
unit cost of his services. 13 Also, if the attorney were to be employed
directly by the group or if an insurance arrangement similar to group
medical insurance plans were to be employed, the cost of the services
received by an individual would be borne by all the members of the
group as one of the costs of membership.' 4 The security of the group
itself and the common experiences of its members in seeking legal rem-
edies would eliminate fear or unwillingness to submit oneself to legal
processes. So too, group experience would generate individual aware-
ness of common legal problems. The problem of selecting an attorney
would be totally solved, since one of the benefits of group association
is ready access to an attorney who is employed by, or who has a re-
ferral agreement with, the group.
I
If we can reasonably be assured that group arrangements can help
satisfy the need for the services of an attorney, why have they not been
employed to the extent necessary? The answer is that the organized
bar has long refused to allow the development of group legal services
despite the obvious benefit to society, and state courts have, for the
most part, reinforced the position of the bar. But recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court have forced the bar to change its
attitude.' i
In the early 1920's the Ethics Committee of the American Bar As-
sociation held that a lawyer may not accept employment in the legal
department of an automobile club which offers legal aid to motorists
in the form of advice on traffic laws and the defense of damage claims
as an inducement to prospective members. Such an arrangement, it
held, would constitute an unauthorized practice of the law.' In Opin-
ion 8 the Committee stated:
The essential dignity of the profession forbids a lawyer to solicit busi-
ness or to exploit his professional services. It follows that he cannot
properly enter into any relations with another to have done for him
's Id. at 667.
14 Id. The American Bar Association has commenced a pilot project in prepaid legal
cost insurance-the first such experiment to test the feasibility of legal services insur-
ance comparable to private health care-insurance now available to the public, 13 A.B.
News, Nov. 1968, at 1, col. 1.
15 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1963); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
16 H. DRINKER, LEGAL ET~ics (1953).
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that which he cannot properly do for himself.
It must therefore be held that the furnishing, selling or exploiting of
the legal services of members of the Bar is derogatory to the dignity
and self-respect of the profession, tends to lower the standards of pro-
fessional character and conduct and thus lessens the usefulness of the
profession to the public, and that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct, when
he makes it possible, by thus allowing his services to be exploited or
dealt in, for others to commercialize the profession and bring it into
disrepute.' 7
Unquestionably it is and always has been beneath professional dig-
nity and detrimental to the public at large for an attorney to exploit or
sell legal services in a commercial manner., But it does seem that the
automobile club could have been permitted to mention in a dignified
manner the availability of legal services. It could have adhered to
strict bar regulations prohibiting the club from interfering with subse-
quent relations between the member and the attorney, and the bar
itself could have instituted a licensing program to provide proper super-
vision of such a group service arrangement. Instead, the entire ar-
rangement was prohibited, and as a result of Opinion 8, Canon 35 of
the Code of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association was
developed.' That canon "does not specifically cover this but is di-
rected rather at [preventing] services to members of associations."' 9
Thus, at this early date the attitude of the organized bar toward group
services became established and, it seems, rigor mortis set in.
2 0
Only once has the American Bar Association sanctioned arrange-
17 Id. at 164.
18 Id. Canon 35 reads as follows:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any
lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A
lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all rela-
tions which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such inter-
mediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility
should be direct to the client. Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigents
are not deemed such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association,
club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in which the
organization, as an entity, is interested, but his-employment should not include the
rendering of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect to
their individual affairs.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 35.
19 Dmmmn,t supra note 16, at 164.
20 It has also been held that such practices violate Canon 47, condemning aid by a
lawyer of the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 165. Canon 47 reads as follows:
No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used in aid of,
or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, personal
or corporate.
ABA CANONS OF PRoFEssioNAL ETHcs No. 47.
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ments similar to the one condemned by Opinion 8.21 In that instance
the attorneys were associated with the American Liberty League, an
organization formed to oppose New Deal legislation. They offered
free legal services to persons who believed that their constitutional
rights had been infringed but who were unable to afford the cost of
litigation. The Bar Association found that the economic and social
issues involved were important enough to transcend the rules of pro-
fessional ethics.2 2 It is not commendable that the Association refused
to extend this rationale to a group legal service program designed to
help any person with a legal problem.
Despite the initial attitude of the American Bar Association, the
need for more adequate legal services persisted, and in the face of
Canon 35, the bar had to seek some means of satisfying it other
than group services. In 1937 the Association created a Special Com-
mittee on Legal Clinics to seek means of solving the problem. This
committee reported in favor of a lawyer reference service.23 A subse-
quent committee went further by calling for the use of lawyer reference
plans and some form of "low-cost legal service methods" to aid "per-
sons who otherwise might not have the benefit of legal advice. '24 But
instead of further investigating the recommendation for providing
low-cost legal services, the Association turned away and until recently
has concentrated on the lawyer reference plan.
Professor Elliott E. Cheatham sharply criticized this head-in-the-sand
attitude and described another problem it generates.
While the bar associations have been reluctant to go beyond lawyer
referral services, others have not been so hesitant. Laymen have
pressed in where lawyers feared to venture. The same year, 1950,
that the American Bar Association quietly channeled the work of its
committee on low cost legal services into the one method of lawyer
referral, three reports of the Association's Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of the Law showed the wide scope of unauthorized practice,
especially in the form of group practice with lay intermediaries re-
taining lawyers and furnishing their services to clients. The outcry by
lawyers has continued and so has the unauthorized practice of law, but
what else could be expected if lawyers do not make readily accessible
the legal services needed!25 (emphasis added).
21 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 148 (1935).
22 Id.
23 Special Comm. on Legal Service Bureaus, Report, 65 A.B.A. REP. 255 (1940);
66 A.B.A. REP., supra note 8.
24 Special Comm. on Legal Service Policies, Report, 71 A.B.A. REP. 240 (1946).
25 CHEATnAM, supra note 7, at 978.
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Not surprisingly, the attitude of the organized bar in California orig-
inally paralleled that of the American Bar Association. In 1958 the
President of the State Bar of California appointed a Committee on
Group Legal Services to examine the problem.2 6  In its final report
that committee set forth several examples of group practice then in
widespread existence and concluded:
The Committee is of the opinion that the need of the public for com-
petent legal advice at fees which they can afford can be met without
changing the existing restrictions upon the practice of law and upon the
conduct of attorneys. The Committee is of the opinion that those re-
strictions are in the public interest and should be maintained. The
provision of competent legal services for persons not eligible for char-
ity can be met either by their seeking lawyers of their own choice with-
out outside help or by their use of the lawyer referral systems.
27
The Committee further recommended that the State Bar of California
adopt Canon 35 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics.2
The comments of the next President of the State Bar on the Com-
mittee's recommendations were devastating.
The core of the problem can be simply stated: Can the average man,
in order to obtain competent legal services at a reasonable price,
join with other average men and through the medium of their associa-
tion obtain such services and pay for them as a group at a lower cost
per member than each would have to pay if he were to contract for
such services as an individual? The answer which the Committee sug-
gests is equally simple: No, he cannot; he must go to a lawyer of his
own choice without outside help or he must select a lawyer from a
list furnished by a Lawyer Reference Service maintained by a local bar
association. In these days of collective security, old age pensions,
unemployment insurance, employers' associations, group insurance
plans, group medical plans, labor unions, employee welfare funds,
employee associations and insurance generally, I am by no means
sure that the Committee's answer is going to continue to satisfy the
public indefinitely.
29
Nevertheless the conclusions and recommendations of the first com-
mittee were ratified by a new investigative committee appointed in
1959.30 Implicit in the latter committee's findings was the conclusion
26 33 S.B.J., supra note 3.
27 34 S.B.I., supra note 3, at 343.
28 Id. at 344.
29 S.B.J., supra note 7, at 643-44.
30 Address by Burnham Enersen, President of State Bar of California, Dec., 1959, in
35 CAL. S.B.J. 11 (1960). The second committee was also known as the Committee
on Group Legal Services.
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that group services are in fact an evil which can and must be eliminated
by strict application of the rule regulating professional conduct.81 This
committee submitted a proposed Rule 20, quite similar to Canon 35,
for addition to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar
of California. 2
There are several theories upon which such disapproval of group
legal services are based. A conflict of interest might arise to confront
the attorney if the interests of the association should differ from those
of its litigating member in a particular case.33 As noted in Opinion 8,
the channeling of legal problems to attorneys by an association might
be construed as an improper solicitation of business, a practice long
condemned in connection with the legal profession. Then, too, the
sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship might be jeopardized due to
the interposition of a third party, the association, which might be in a
position to control the litigation.
These possible abuses cannot be underestimated; professional stand-
ards are indeed necessary: On the other hand, fear of abuse cannot
be allowed to prevent the development of proper programs designed to
bring adequate legal services to ali who need them in our society.81
31 In light of all the evidence available that many persons go without needed legal
services, the Committee's conclusion was remarkable:
The relationship between attorney and client shall remain inviolate. The ethics of
the profession shall be maintained and all people shall be free to select attorneys
of their choice. The Committee finds that there are adequate services available at
a reasonable cost.
Standing Comm. on Group Legal Services, Report, 35 CAL. S.B.J. 710, 720-21 (1960).
It is unbelievable that such a dogmatic assertion would be made. The conclusion is
reminiscent of the A.B.A.'s old Opinion 8, rendered in 1925, but here it is forty-four
years later. It also ignores the evidence. And whether the attorney-client relationship
"shall remain inviolate," to use its god-like phrase, is not within this committee's power
to say; that relationship most certainly will be violated, if not severed, if a positive
attempt to bridge the gap between the need for and the availability of legal services is
not made.
32 35 CAL. S.B.J. 724 (1960).
33 This conflict arises frequently in litigation involving liability insurance policies.
Theoretically the defense attorney represents the insured defendant. But does he really?
Suppose an offer to settle within the limits of the defendant's policy is disapproved by
the insurance company and therefore refused by the defense attorney; suppose further
that a verdict is ultimately rendered which exceeds the policy limits, to the dismay of
the insured defendant. Is that not a "conflict of interest" case of classical proportions?
See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
34 For years the organized bar in California refused to allow lawyers to incorporate
for fear of abuse of the attorney-client relationship and destruction of the traditional
form of practice, but that opposition prevented lawyers from obtaining certain tax
advantages enjoyed by other businesses. So in 1968 a bill [Cal. S.B. 53, Reg. Sess.
(1968) (Moscone)] was introduced in the California Legislature, in spite of the bar's
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It is easy to advocate a lawyer reference service as the solution to the
problem-easy because this allows existing professional standards to
stand inviolate as examples to the public of the sublime ethical prin-
ciples of the profession. It is as though we in the temples of the law
are telling those without that the regulation of our moral standards is
more important than our obligation to provide them with the services
that make the law more than a mere abstraction or an authoritarian
tool to them.
We are in the position of saying that a man who cannot otherwise
afford legal services should nevertheless be prevented from pooling his
money with others in a formal association, seeking the advice of an
attorney selected by thie association, and paying that attorney with
money contributed by other members of the group as a price of mem-
bership. Why can he not do that? He cannot because we, the organ-
ized bar, are afraid that our professional standards will be violated.
But what has that individual done to corrupt us? Nothing. He has
simply sought to secure for himself the services necessary to protect his
legal rights-services which only we, the very ones who have now
prevented him from securing them, can give. If he had a forum, he
could point out that by preventing him :from securing legal services in
this manner, we are admitting, before the fact, that lawyers are dis-
honest, that they will not recognize and seek to free themselves from
conflicts of interests, that they will exploit the-association in an im-
proper manner to secure business, and that they will allow the associa-
tion to impinge upon their duty toward and relationship with their
client. It would be much wiser for the profession to assert, quite
truthfully, that the great majority of lawyers would not allow those
things to happen in any situation and that professional regulations can
certainly be devised which would deter such abuses irrespective of the
means people use to seek legal help. Such an attitude would be far
more realistic and appreciative of today's complexities and of the in-
herent ethics of our profession.
Fortunately, a change in attitude has begun to emerge. Paradoxi-
cally, the State Bar of California is in part responsible for the change.
After hearings on proposed Rule 20; a rule designed by the second
traditional opposition, on the premise that further delay was simply unfair to those who
might benefit. As a result, the State Bar took another look at the matter, decided it
should be involved if incorporation was to become a reality, and cooperated to develop
a bill which would maintain professionalism and yet allow for better economic treat-
ment to those affected. The measure was ultimately enacted and signed into law.
Cal. Stats. -, ch. 1375 (Reg. Sess. 1968).
1969]
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State Bar committee3 5 to completely eliminate group legal services, the
Board of Governors appointed a third committee to continue the study
of group legal services and to make recommendations prior to the adop-
tion of any new rule of professional conduct. Perhaps the Board
sensed that the reports of the first two committees were somewhat
anachronistic. The report of the third committee, which we shall call
the Enersen Report,3 is one of the most exhaustive and enlightened
statements on the group legal service concept87 Some of its more
significant conclusions are:
[1.] [T]here is an unfilled need for legal services of such a sub-
stantial degree as to cause serious concern .... 8
[2.] [T]here is a present substantial public demand for group-type
legal services. 39
[3.] [I]t is in the public interest that the State Bar of California
meet the need which this demand for group-type legal services
reflects. . . . [T]he Rules of Professional Conduct of the State
Bar should be amended accordingly. 40
Based on these conclusions, the Enersen Report contained the fol-
lowing basic recommendations, among others:
1. Associations or groups may actively attempt to channel legal
problems of their members to certain designated attorneys.
2. Attorneys may enter arrangements with such associations setting
forth the terms of employment and the association may pay the
attorney fee.
3. These arrangements need not be limited to nonprofit associations.
4. The legal services provided need not be limited to problems of
"common interest" to the group. Such a limitation ignores the bas-
35 S.B.J., supra note 31.
36 S.B.J., supra note 7. The chairman was Burnham Enersen of San Francisco.
37 This committee's "interim report" to the Board of Governors reflected an attitude
which was suggestive of the open-minded approach it would take:
The review of these developments led the Committee to a somewhat uneasy feeling
that perhaps society may be moving ahead of the legal profession in searching for
and experimenting with ways and means of dealing with these problems. It was
also felt that trends may be developing which can have substantial impact upon
the practice of law and upon the economic welfare of the members of the legal
profession. At the same time it was agreed that no proper solution of these prob-
lems could be predicated upon consideration of the personal interests of lawyers
alone, but rather that in any proper solution the public interest must receive para-
mount consideration.
Id. at 648-49.
38 Id. at 722.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 723. This recommendation is in direct opposition to those of the first two
State Bar committees to study the problem.
[Vol. 2
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ic consideration underlying these recommendations: the need of the
public for legal services.4 '
Finally, if the recommendations were to be adopted, the Report
urged that certain restrictions on group legal service plans likewise be
adopted and vigorously enforced to avoid the abuses feared in earlier
reports.
42
Shortly thereafter, the American Bar Association appointed its
latest Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services to consider
once again the extent of the public's unfilled need for legal services and
to evaluate existing and new methods for fulfilling that need, spe-
cifically including group legal service programs.4 3  This committee
made a proposed policy statement to the Association's House of Dele-
gates at its 1968 meeting that group legal service arrangements, with
adequate safeguards, would be in the public interest. "'We have con-
cluded,'" the committee reported, "'that the proper question is not, is
there a need for group legal service arrangements, but rather why
should not we, the legal profession, make our services available on
this basis if the public wants it that way?' ,44 (emphasis added). In
short, the Committee placed the interest of the public ahead of any in-
ternal policing problems the profession might have. Recently the As-
sociation's Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, which
had a long history of opposition to such arrangements, concurred in
the Legal Service Committee's policy statement favoring group legal
services.45
The American Bar Association has yet to formally adopt a policy
statement favoring group legal services. In fact, continuing investiga-
tion of the proposal has served to harden the opposition of certain bar
groups who are against any change along this line. The majority of
bar representatives testifying at further hearings by the Special Com-
mittee on the Availability of Legal Services in Chicago, on October 25
and 26, 1968, expressed the view that advocates of group legal serv-
ices have not demonstrated that a real need exists for such programs.
The Illinois State Bar Association said that if groups were permitted
to organize and employ lawyers, "the days of the private practitioner
. . . will be numbered. No greater threat has yet been proposed to the
4' Id. at 724-26.
42 Id. at 723-24.
43 Special Comm. on Availability of Legal Services, Report, 91 A.B.A. RP. 226
(1966).
44 13 A.B. News, Nov., 1968, at 6, col. 1.
45 A.B.A. Standing Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, Annual Report, 34
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 76 (Summer 1968).
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independence and integrity of the bar."46 This clearly reveals the
real reason many oppose the expansion of group legal services. The
concern with professional ethics has been a convenient rationalization
for opposition, but the sole practitioner who opposes expansion does so
because he sees it as a threat to his existence. In other words, self-
preservation, whether or not in the public interest, is dominant.
One eminent writer, Henry S. Drinker, had this to say about the
attitude:
The real argument against their [group legal services] approval by the
bar is believed to be loss of income to the lawyers and concentration
of service in hands of fewer lawyers. These features do not commend
the profession to the public.
47
It is difficult to criticize opposition based on an apparent threat to
one's livelihood. Indeed, it is easier to criticize those lawyers who
favor group legal services because they will be in a position to benefit
most from such arrangements. Nevertheless, the writers believe that
the profession must make such services available if there is any need
whatever for group legal services. We are quite certain that the
American Bar Association will ultimately reach the same conclusion
and endorse group legal services.
IV
Until recently, consideration of the concept of group legal services
concerned the advisability of modifying professional standards to al-
low such arrangements. The underlying assumption was that the State
controlled the issue through its power to regulate professional conduct.
This assumption was implicit in various state cases dealing with the
issue.
The key California case was Hildebrand v. State Bar,48 which in-
volved the question whether certain attorneys had violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct by entering into an agreement with a union,
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, to furnish legal services to its
members. The State Bar charged that the attorneys had violated rules
prohibiting the solicitation of employment40 and the acceptance of pro-
fessional employment incident to the activities of another unlicensed
person or of "any association . . . that for compensation controls, di-
46 A.B. News, supra note 44.
47 DRINmKR, supra note 16, at 167.
48 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
49 Id. at 505, 225 P.2d at 509.
[Vol. 2
GROUP LEGAL SERVICES
rects or influences such employment." 50
The Brotherhood's legal services plan is the oldest and best known
of all the legal aid programs established by labor organizations in the
United States.5 ' It was determined in 1930 that in claims against the
railroads, the employees "were getting absolutely no legal advice and
were relying entirely upon the railroads' furnishing them with informa-
tion as to their rights, with the result that settlements were being
made which were . . . unconscionable." 52 Under the plan, the Union
established a legal aid department to provide investigative and pro-
fessional services to those members involved in claims against the
railroads. The charges were to be less than the usual contingent fee
in similar cases.53 That department designated regional counsel in
each area of the country, and Union members were urged to employ
them. Contracts were executed directly between counsel and claimant.
In most cases they provided for a twenty-five per cent contingent fee, a
small percentage of which was to be paid to the Union to offset the
expenses incurred in operating the legal aid department.
Petitioners in Hildebrand were regional counsel. They knew, in the
court's words,
. . . how their professional employment . .. was being solicited for
them through the Brotherhood's activities, and they were willing to
perform the desired legal services at a substantially reduced contingent
fee rate in the belief that the volume of business to be directed to them
through such solicitation would warrant such financial consideration. 54
The court therefore expressed the view that the petitioners' participa-
tion in the scheme "cannot be condoned as consistent with the ethical
proprieties exacted of the members of the bar in this state."55  The
court simply considered the Union's arrangement with the attorneys in
light of the literal language of the rules of conduct, and found con-
flict. It did not mention the railroads' history of scandalous treatment
of those employees who were injured in the course of employment and
refused to settle on the railroads' terms.5" It should have realized that
50 Id. at 510, 225 P.2d at 512.
51 Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case of BRT, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 306 (1965).
52 Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 M11. App. 364, 370 (1932).
53 36 Cal. 2d 504, 508, 225 P.2d 508, 510 (1950).
54 Id. at 509, 225 P.2d at 511.
55 Id. at 514, 225 P.2d at 514.
5 Bodle, supra note 51, at 309. This article contains a good review of the course
of conduct followed by the railroads. Consider the following excerpt from an investi-
gative report prepared by the Railroad Retirement Board at the request of the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:
We further take judicial notice of respondent's exhibit, . . . a report of the Rail-
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this was a case where adequate legal services were drastically needed
and could be obtained only by some sort of group arrangement. This
was not a situation in which to make rules of conduct applicable on a
technical basis in the absence of clear proof of a conflict of interest
detrimental to the employer or employee.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Roger Traynor (now Chief Justice)
found no violation of rules of ethics if properly applied. His premise
was:
[T]he primary duty of the legal profession [is] to serve the public,
[and] the rules it establishes to govern its professional ethics must be
directed at the performance of that duty. Canons of ethics that would
operate to deny to the railroad employees the effective legal assistance
they need can be justified only if such a denial is necessary to sup-
press professional conduct that in other cases would be injurious to the
effective discharge of the profession's duties to the public.57
After examining each of the rules allegedly violated and giving examples
of the practices they were meant to proscribe, he found the arrange-
ment in question to be ethical and proper:
In the present case, however, it is not contended that the Brotherhood
is engaged in the practice of law, and there is no evidence of evils that
the Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to guard against.
The Brotherhood's plan in no way lowers the dignity of the profession.
It does not lead the railroad employees to incompetent counsel. There
is no conflict in the interest of the Brotherhood and its members, and
therefore no danger that the attorneys recommended by the Brotherhood
will be faced with conflicting allegiances. There is no interference with
the direct attorney-client relationship; the members are free to retain or
reject the attorneys recommended by the Brotherhood and they deal
directly with the attorneys themselves15
Justice Traynor's remarks are refreshing in their emphasis on the
fact that professional rules must be designed with the interest of the
public foremost in mind. To the extent that they thwart efforts to
provide needed legal services, the public is not served. Incidentally,
Justice Traynor's opinion, along with a similar one by Justice Carter,
foreshadowed the United States Supreme Court decisions to come a
decade and a half later.
road Retirement Board to the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, which we
believe bears directly on this proceeding. That report shows a general course of
conduct and a highly antagonistic attitude of the railroads toward all employees
who retain counsel to defend their rights; that in Federal employers' liability cases
settled without counsel, 97% of the employees returned to work for the railroad;
while if suit was filed, from 80% to 96% of such employees lost their jobs.
57 36 Cal. 2d 504, 522, 225 P.2d 508, 519 (1950).
58 Id. at 527, 225 P.2d at 522.
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Similar proceedings have been filed in several other state courts and
in the federal courts. The outcome has usually been similar to that in
Hildebrand, although some courts have found the arrangement to be
ethical and approved it. 9 Running through all these cases is the
central assumption that the State has an inherent right to regulate the
practice of law and does so through the rules of professional conduct
established by its organized bar association. As in Hildebrand, the
courts have simply sought to determine whether the practice in ques-
tion is prohibited by those rules. With the exception of the opinions
by Justices Traynor and Carter, there is no hint in the cases of the
type of limitation on the states' power which was eventually developed
in three recent United States Supreme Court decisions. It is these de-
cisions which have forced bar associations to reconsider opposition
to group legal services.
The issue reached the Supreme Court from an unexpected source in
NAACP v. Button.60 That case involved the Virginia State Confer-
ence of the NAACP, composed of eighty-nine chapters, which main-
tained a paid legal staff of attorneys to assist its members in actions
based on racial discrimination. Cases were obtained upon application
from members which often followed chapter meetings where staff
attorneys explained the legal steps necessary to bring about the end of
various types of discrimination. Thus, cases were actively solicited as
a practical matter. The Conference completely financed those cases in
which the litigant retained NAACP staff counsel to represent him.
Often the attorney assigned to the case was one with whom the in-
dividual previously had no contact. In fact, "the prospective litigant
retain[ed] not so much a particular attorney as the 'firm' of NAACP
and Defense Fund lawyers . . .. 1
Virginia's highest court had held that the practice violated not only
Canon 35 and 47 of the ABA 2 but also chapter 33 of the state's
50 E.g., Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 M11. App. 364 (1932); Jacksonville Bar Ass'n
v. Wilson, 102 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1958); Azzorello v. Legal Aid Soe'y, 117 Ohio App.
471, 185 N.E.2d 566 (1962).
00 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
61 Id. at 421-22.
62 Prior to 1956 no attempt was made to prohibit these activities of the NAACP,
which had been carried on for many years. But in that year Chapter 33 was added to
the Virginia Code to amend the definition of "runner" or "capper" (those engaged in
illegal solicitation) to include an agent for an organization which retains a lawyer in
connection with an action in which it is not a party and in which it has no real interest.
For the pertinent amendments see VA. CODE, §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 (1950), as amended,
Acts of 1956, Ex. Sess., ch. 33 (Repl. Vol. 1958). It is probably not illogical to assume
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code, which forbids the solicitation of legal business by a "runner" or
"capper."'63  The court stated that the NAACP was guilty of "solicit-
ing legal business in which they are not parties and have no pecuniary
right or liability, and which they channel to the enrichment of certain
lawyers employed by them, at no cost to the litigants and over which
the litigants have no control."
64
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ac-
tivities of the NAACP and legal staff are "modes of expression and
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which
Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal pro-
fession, as improper solicitation of legal business."65 To the conten-
tion that "solicitation" is a practice wholly outside the area of First
Amendment freedoms, the Court replied that "a State cannot foreclose
the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels"' and "abstract
discussion is not the only species of communication which the Consti-
tution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy,
certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. '7  The
NAACP's ends are lawful-the equality of treatment by all govern-
ments for all members of the Negro community in the country-and
litigation is a desirable means of achieving those ends. Such litigation
is, in fact, "a form of political expression"68 well within the scope of
the First Amendment.
As the Court interpreted Virginia's law forbidding solicitation, a
person who informed another that his legal rights had been infringed
and referred him to a particular attorney was guilty of a crime, as was
any attorney who acted as counsel knowing the circumstances of the
referral. But by forbidding NAACP members to advise prospective
litigants to seek counsel in this manner, Virginia was choking off the
most effective means of expression for this minority group, which was
more likely to achieve success in the courts than at the polls.
The Court impliedly conceded that group legal service arrangements
might be constitutionally restricted if there were an overriding and com-
pelling state interest in restriction.69 However, after weighing the in-
that this Act of the Virginia Legislature was a reaction to the monumental decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63 DRmKER, supra note 16; Canon 35, supra note 18; Canon 47, supra note 20.
64 NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 155, 116 S.E.2d 55, 66 (1960).
65 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963).
66 Id. at 429.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 438.
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terest of the State in controlling the legal profession against the limi-
tations imposed upon the NAACP's activities, it held that the State
had failed to demonstrate "any substantial regulatory interest in the form
of substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justify -
the broad prohibitions which it has imposed."70  The traditional
evils71 which the statute in question and the rules of professional con-
duct were meant to prevent did not result from the NAACP's ar-
rangement.
It would be convenient to read the Button decision as applying
only to group service arrangements involving forms of political expres-
sion, and just such an interpretation has often been made.72 But the
decision in the next important case, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia State Bar,73 indicated that the Court intended a broader scope.
Much as the State Bar of California had done in Hildebrand,74 the Vir-
ginia State Bar had successfully sought through the state courts to en-
join the activities of the Brotherhood in providing legal aid to its mem-
bers, on the ground that its plan involved the stirring up of litigation
and amounted to the unauthorized practice of law. The Union had
admitted that it advised its members to obtain legal advice before set-
tling personal injury claims arising from their employment, that it cus-
tomarily recommended particular attorneys, and that in fact the plan
did result in the channeling of employment to those attorneys so rec-
ommended. In reversing the Virginia court's decree enjoining such
practices, the Supreme Court relied upon Button and concluded that
First Amendment protections shielded the plan:
[T]he First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, petition, and
assembly give railroad workers the right to gather together for the law-
ful purpose of helping and advising one another in asserting the rights
Congress gave them in the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, statutory rights which would be vain and futile
70 Id. at 444.
71 However valid may be Virginia's interest in regulating the traditionally illegal
practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty, that interest does not justify the
prohibition of the NAACP activities disclosed by this record. Malicious intent was
of the essence of the common law offenses of fomenting or stirring up litigation.
And whatever may be or may have been true of suits against government in other
countries, the exercise in our own, as in this case, of First Amendment rights to
enforce constitutional rights through litigation, as a matter of law, cannot be
deemed malicious.
Id. at 439-40.
72 See, e.g., Justice Clark's dissent in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 9 (1963); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 35
Ill. 2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503 (1966).
73 377 U.S. 1 (1963).
74 36 Cal. 2d 504, 255 P.2d 508 (1950).
1969]
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
if the workers could not talk together freely as to the best course to
follow. The right of members to consult with each other in a fraternal
organization necessarily includes the right to select a spokesman from
their number who could be expected to give the wisest counsel. That
is the role played by the members who carry out the legal aid pro-
gram. And the right of the workers personally or through a special
department of their Brotherhood to advise concerning the need for
legal assistance-and, most importantly, what lawyer a member could
confidently rely on-is an inseparable part of this constitutionally
guaranteed right to assist and advise each other.
75
The majority rejected the argument of Justice Clark, who was joined
in dissent by Justice Harlan, that the decision "overthrows state regula-
tion of the legal profession and relegates the practice of law to a com-
mercial enterprise. ' 76  Justice Clark further argued, to no avail, that
Button was not applicable.
Personal injury litigation is not a form of political expression, but rather
a procedure for the settlement of damage claims. No guaranteed civil
right is involved. Here, the question involves solely the regulation of the
profession, a power long recognized as belonging particularly to the
state.7
7
As in Button, the Court indicated that the State could still invoke
its regulatory powers in a proper case to prohibit practices which in
fact provoke abuse and debase the legal profession. This was implicit
in its answer to the argument that the Brotherhood's practices amounted
to an unethical scheme of solicitation in which the Brotherhood and
the attorney accepting referrals were involved. In examining the charge,
the Court said that "what Virginia has sought to halt here is not
a commercialization of the legal profession which might threaten the
moral and ethical fabric of the administration of justice. It is not
'ambulance chasing.' "8 And the workers "by recommending compe-
tent lawyers to each other, obviously are not themselves engaging in
the practice of law, nor are they or the lawyers whom they select
parties to any soliciting of business.
'79
Aside from the ambiguous reference to "ambulance chasing," how-
ever, the Court did not explicitly say what sort of arrangement would
constitute unauthorized practice or solicitation. It appears that the
limits will be delineated on a case-by-case basis as group practice
75 377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1963).
76 id. at 9.
77 Id. at 10.
78 Id. at 6.
79 Id. at 6-7.
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plans become more popular and as bar associations respond with
regulatory efforts. The Court will no doubt continue to employ the
"balancing" technique used in the Button and BRT cases. Such meth-
ods have been subject to criticism on the ground that by simply
weighing all possible interests in each individual case, the Court will
not be able to structure positive doctrines to guide future decisions."
But such criticism seems shortsighted. It would be an impossible task
for a court at this time to visualize all or even most of the variations
group practice may be expected to take and then to announce a rule
which is sufficiently broad to encompass all those variations yet con-
cise enough to constitute a practicable guideline. Thus far the three
principal cases to come before the Supreme Court have involved group
practice arrangements within that speculative limit beyond which lie
the unethical evils which cannot be tolerated. Truly definitive guide-
lines will appear only when a decision is rendered which finds a par-
ticular arrangement to be outside the scope of the First Amendment
and therefore subject to prohibition by the State under its regulatory
powers.
The decision in the United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n8 l is the most recent in this area, but in that case, too, the Court
sanctioned a group service plan previously found by Illinois courts to
constitute unauthorized practice. As did BRT, that case involved a
union program that had been in successful operation for decades. The
Mine Workers Union had established a legal department in 1913 to
enable its members to obtain benefits made possible by the enactment
of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Statute. That action was
prompted by the discovery of abuses wherein "the interests of the
members were being juggled and even when not, they were required
to pay forty or fifty per cent of the amounts recovered in damage suits,
for attorney fees." '82 The Union employed an attorney on a salary
basis to represent workers with claims for personal injuries arising from
their employment. The terms of the attorney's employment explicitly
provided that he would receive no interference from Union officials
and that he would have obligations to and relations with only the per-
sons he represented. Union members were allowed to seek other
counsel and, in fact, were often advised to do so. The attorney re-
ceived no part of any settlement or award, his sole compensation be-
ing the salary paid by the Union. In an action filed by the Illinois
80 Recent Developments, 63 CoLTrm. L. REv. 1502, 1511 (1963).
81 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
82 Id. at 219.
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State Bar, however, the trial court found that the employment of an
attorney in this manner constituted unauthorized practice. Among
other things, the court permanently enjoined the Union from employing
attorneys to represent its members.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the contention that
the injunction violated the workers' First Amendment rights as set
forth in Button and BRT. It attempted to distinguish BRT by noting
that the decision in that case "protected plans under which workers
were advised to consult specific attorneys, but did not extend to pro-
tect plans involving an explicit hiring of such attorneys by the Un-
ion. 83  The court viewed the Button case "as concerned chiefly with
litigation that can be characterized as a form of political expression.
'
"84
But the United States Supreme Court, Justice Black writing the
opinion, made it clear that such simple distinctions were false:
We do not think that our decisions in Trainmen and Button can be so
narrowly limited. We hold that the freedom of speech, assembly and
petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives
petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its
members in the assertion of their legal rights.85
The Court had long held that government is not free to prohibit even
indirectly the free exercise of First Amendment freedoms.8 0 Laws which
affect the exercise of such rights cannot be sustained merely because
they are meant to deal with some evil otherwise within the States'
legislative competence.8 Hence, regulation of the practice of law,
which is within the States' power, cannot be allowed to unjustifiably
impair the value of associational freedoms. Those principles, invoked
in Button and BRT, were held to apply here as well. The dangers of a
conflict of interests in the United Mine Workers' arrangement were
found to be, at the very most, "conceivable. 88 The decree at issue
"thus substantially impairs the associational rights of the Mine Workers
and is not needed to protect the State's interest in high standards of
legal ethics."89
Certainly this decision will once and for all lay to rest the conten-
83 Id. at 221.
84 Id. The Illinois Court chose to make this distinction even though it had been
ignored by the majority in BRT. It was, in fact, the distinction on which Justice Clark's
dissenting opinion in that case rested.
85 Id. at 221-22.
86 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
87 Id.
88 389 U.S. 217, 224 (1967).
89 Id. at 225.
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tions that Button can be distinguished because it involved "political
expression" and BRT because the Union merely referred members to
attorneys. Such things as the involvement of political rights or the
mode of operation (whether a mere reference to, or actual employment
of, a lawyer) are incidental. Taken alone they do not justify pro-
hibition of the exercise of associational rights as found in the group
legal service arrangements involved in these cases. There must be
something more. Rather than mere speculation or inferences based
on something which is "conceivable," there must be substantial evi-
dence of practices which justify the invocation of a State's regulatory
power. What these evil practices will constitute has not been decided.
One can guess, for example, that proof of direct interference in the
litigation by a non-attorney officer of an association would call for
regulatory action, as would specific proof of some sort of conflict of
interest necessarily resulting from a group service arrangement. But
in none of the cases discussed was any concrete evidence of that
nature offered.
V
It happened that each of the group practice arrangements thus far
reviewed by the Supreme Court was established by groups of persons
with common interests. This is not strange, nor is it an outstanding
feature distinguishing these cases, since any persons found within a
particular social group are bound to have common interests. It also
happened that legal services were sought by those groups for reasons
common to the purpose for which the members had formed a group,
i.e., vindication of political rights or redress of personal injury suffered
as a result of one's employment. It has therefore been suggested that
the decisions may be read as approving group services only when "lim-
ited to matters related to the common principal purposes" for which the
group was formed.90 It may be assumed that such a limitation would
90 The Board of Governors of the State Bar of California has devised a "Proposed
Rule 20" to be added to the Rules of Professional Conduct. In pertinent part it reads
as follows:
The participation of a member of the State Bar in a plan for the provision of legal
services to the individual members of a group or organization, as herein defined,
either on a salary basis or otherwise, is not in violation of these Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct if the member's participation conforms to the said plan and if the
terms of such plan
(1) are contained in a writing duly authenticated by an authorized representa-
tive of the group or organization and filed with the State Bar and set forth
the nature and extent of the legal services to be made available under such
plan,
(2) contain adequate provisions which will
(a) limit such legal services to matters related to the common principal
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mean, for example, that the attorney selected by a labor union would
be prohibited from representing a worker in a divorce case or a per-
sonal injury case unrelated to his employment. We submit, however,
that a policy limitation of that nature is the result of an unwarranted
reading of the United States Supreme Court cases. Furthermore, it is
unworkable and unwise. The facts in the three cases support such a
limitation, but the principles enunciated do not.
Nowhere in the decisions can language be found which justifies the
conclusion that group service arrangements will be prohibited unless
they provide solely for the rendering of services related to the pur-
pose for which the group was formed. If that had been the simple
rule laid down in Button or BRT, then surely the Illinois court would
have recognized it in rendering the initial decision in UMW, and the
United States Supreme Court would have expanded upon it in its
UMW decision. Such a theory was never considered.
Suppose that the only common purpose of a particular group is that
of securing and financing legal services for its members. In that
case would the proposed limitation really be any limitation at all? It
would not seem so, for any type of legal service would be related to
the common principal purpose for which the group was formed. With-
out further explanation, then, we are left with a proposed restriction
which can only confuse the issue. It has the appearance of a limita-
tion, but as we read it, it allows the ultimate form of group legal serv-
ices. Surely that is not intended, but considerable clarification is
needed.
As a practical matter, how will an attorney serving under a group
plan know what kinds of cases he can take in that capacity if the
proposed limitation were to be adopted? What would the attorney give
his client as the reason for his inability to handle his divorce case?
purposes for which such group or organization was formed and pro-
vide personal and adequate legal representation for such matters ....
43 CAL. S.B.J. 474, 474-75 (1968).
It has not yet been determined whether the proposed rule will be adopted. In any
event the following statement by the current President of the State Bar, Samuel 0.
Pruitt, is most commendable and encouraging:
In my opinion, there is substantial evidence before the Board of a pressing need
for an affirmative recognition that group plans are permissible, and indeed should
be encouraged to develop in line with standards designed to serve the best interests
of the public; that it is in the public interest that such plans should be regulated in
some way, or that at least some guidance be given, so as to preserve those ethical
and fiduciary characteristics that are the hallmark of a learned profession and dis-
tinguish us from commercial tradesmen; and that the failure to come to grips with
this challenge by devising the best solutions within our capacities-and to do so
soon-is to be derelict in our responsibilities to the public and to ourselves.
Pruitt, President's Message, 43 CAL. S.B.J. 853, 857 (1968).
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He would probably say that the rules of conduct laid down by his
bar association will not allow him to take the case because of a possible
conflict of interest. But a curious and no doubt confused client
would then be told that if the attorney could take the case, he would
never allow such a conflict to come about. The client, who in most
cases would have paid for legal services in the form of union dues or
the like, would then be forced to retain yet another attorney on an
individual basis in what appears, at least to the client, to be part of
the same dispute. If the profession is truly concerned about its public
image, it will not allow that kind of situation to develop.
VI
We have attempted to show, as concisely as possible, the fluctua-
tions in thought and action regarding group legal services. From
1926, when the regressive Opinion 8 was rendered, to 1963, when the
decision in NAACP v. Button came down, there was always the pos-
sibility that group service arrangements could be disapproved and pro-
hibited at any time. But Button and its descendant decisions made
it clear that bar associations cannot prevent group practice where there
is a mere possibility that a conflict of interests might result. Since
basic constitutional rights are involved, a high degree of proof of cir-
cumstances which justify application of the States' power to regulate
the profession will be required before particular practice arrangements
may be prohibited.
Although group legal services were of concern to the organized bar
for many years prior to Button, that decision precipitated new efforts
which are favorable to the broadened use of group services. It is
most desirable that this trend continue to the point where legal services
are available in some manner to all those who need them. When the
lawyer becomes a readily accessible member of the community, able
and willing to help anyone in need of his skills, the profession can
cease worrying about its image, at least among persons at lower eco-
nomic and cultural levels. The inaccessibility of lawyers to persons
in those categories has caused a freakish sort of awe, but it has also
generated in them a frightening amount of distrust. Unsophisticated
persons naturally tend to distrust and dislike those with whom they
are not in ready contact. It is not illogical to conclude that the pro-
fession's overriding concern for its ethical principles has, in this in-
stance at least, caused a lessening of respect for lawyers and the law.
We submit, then, that a continued relaxation of our overextended and
19691
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unjustified fear of group legal services on ethical grounds will result
in a better public image for lawyers.
Recent events have shown that the underprivileged and the ag-
grieved in our society will not allow their reasonable demands to go
unanswered. Fortunately our courts, if not our legislatures, have for
the most part responded in a positive manner to diminish the threat of
widespread revolt and concomitant repression. But the courts are just
one segment of the legal apparatus and they cannot work alone.
Lawyers, too, must become more intimately involved in this social
struggle, increasing their willingness to represent any and all persons
with reasonable demands before any appropriate forum. A broaden-
ing of the use and availability of group legal services will help to
make the necessary degree of involvement possible.
